San diego v. san diego norml




















Cannabis Cultivators Club N. Because the CSA law does not compel the states to impose criminal penalties for marijuana possession, the requirement that counties issue cards identifying those against whom California has opted not to impose criminal penalties does not positively conflict with the CSA. Accordingly, we reject Counties' claim that positive conflict preemption invalidates the identification laws because Counties' compliance with those laws can "consistently stand together" with adherence to the provisions of the CSA.

Although we conclude title 21 United States Code section signifies Congress's intent to maintain the power of states to elect "to 'serve as a laboratory' in the trial of 'novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country' " United Statesv.

Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative U. Although state laws may be preempted under obstacle preemption when the law " ' "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" ' " Viva! To the contrary, "[d]isplacement will occur only where, as we have variously described, a 'significant conflict' exists between an identifiable 'federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,' [citation] or the application of state law would 'frustrate specific objectives.

United Technologies Corp. Indeed, Boyle implicitly recognized that when Congress has legislated in a field that the states have traditionally occupied, rather than in an area of unique federal concern, obstacle preemption requires an even sharper conflict with federal policy before the state statute will be invalidated.

We conclude the identification card laws do not pose a significant impediment to specific federal objectives embodied in the CSA. The purpose of the CSA is to combat recreational drug use, not to regulate a state's medical practices.

Gonzalez v. The identification card laws merely provide a mechanism allowing qualified California citizens, if they so elect, to obtain a form of identification that informs state law enforcement officers and others that they are medically exempted from the state's criminal sanctions for marijuana possession and use. Although California's decision to enact statutory exemptions from state criminal prosecution for such persons arguably undermines the goals of or is inconsistent with the CSA--a question we do not decide here--any alleged "obstacle" to the federal goals is presented by those California statutes that create the exemptions, not by the statutes providing a system for rapidly identifying exempt individuals.

The identification card statutes impose no significant added obstacle to the purposes of the CSA not otherwise inherent in the provisions of the exemptions that Counties do not have standing to challenge, and we therefore conclude the limited provisions of the MMP that Counties may challenge are not preempted by principles of obstacle preemption. We are unpersuaded by Counties' arguments that the identifications laws, standing alone, present significant obstacles to the purposes of the CSA.

Counties also appear to assert the identification card laws present a significant obstacle to the CSA because the bearer of an identification card will not be arrested by California's law enforcement officers despite being in violation of the CSA.

However, the unstated predicate of this argument is that the federal government is entitled to conscript a state's law enforcement officers into enforcing federal enactments, over the objection of that state, and this entitlement will be obstructed to the extent the identification card precludes California's law enforcement officers from arresting medical marijuana users.

The argument falters on its own predicate because Congress does not have the authority to compel the states to direct their law enforcement personnel to enforce federal laws. In Printz v. United States U. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.

Conant v. Walters, supra, F. We conclude that even if Congress intended to preempt state laws that present a significant obstacle to the CSA, the MMP identification card laws are not preempted. The CUA was adopted by initiative when the voters adopted Proposition People v. Urziceanu Cal. Article II, section 10, subdivision c of the California Constitution provides the Legislature may "amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.

This issue, although not pleaded in the complaints filed by either San Bernardino or San Diego, was initially raised by County of Merced's Merced complaint in intervention. State argues on appeal that because Merced has not appealed, and only Merced formally pleaded the Article II, section 10, subdivision c , issue, we may not on appeal consider San Bernardino's arguments as to this issue.

During oral arguments on the motions for judgment on the pleadings, San Bernardino adopted and joined in Merced's arguments, without objection by State that the arguments were beyond the scope of San Bernardino's pleadings. Additionally, the trial court's judgment, after noting that one of the issues raised by Merced and joined in by San Bernardino was the Article II, section 10, subdivision c , issue, specifically noted in its judgment that "[a]t oral argument, each party agreed that all plaintiffs win or lose together," and thereafter ruled on the Article II, section 10, subdivision c , issue.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that because 1 the parties litigated the matter below on the understanding that San Diego and San Bernardino were properly asserting the additional ground of invalidity raised by Merced, and 2 the trial court's judgment against San Bernardino included a rejection of all of the arguments raised by all co-plaintiffs, San Bernardino may litigate this issue on appeal.

Dutra Construction Co. Although legislative acts are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality, the Legislature cannot amend an initiative, including the CUA, unless the initiative grants the Legislature authority to do so. Amwest Surety Ins.

Wilson 11 Cal. Because the CUA did not grant the Legislature the authority to amend it without voter approval, and the identification laws were enacted without voter approval, those laws are invalid if they amend the CUA within the meaning of Article II, section 10, subdivision c of the California Constitution. The proscription embodied in Article II, section 10, subdivision c of the California Constitution is designed to " 'protect the people's initiative powers by precluding the Legislature from undoing what the people have done, without the electorate's consent.

Quackenbush 64 Cal. Escondido Mobilepark West 35 Cal. Cooper 27 Cal. The identification laws do not improperly amend the provisions of the CUA. For example, unlike the CUA which did not immunize medical marijuana users from arrest but instead provided a limited "immunity" defense to prosecution under state law for cultivation or possession of marijuana, see People v. Mower 28 Cal. Additionally, the MMP exempts the bearer of an identification card as well as qualified patients as defined by the MMP from liability for other controlled substance offenses not expressly made available to medical marijuana users under the CUA.

Counties, relying on Franchise Tax Board v. Cory 80 Cal. Cory, supra, 80 Cal. Here, although the legislation that enacted the MMP added statutes regarding California's treatment of those who use medical marijuana or who aid such users, it did not add statutes or standards to the CUA.

Instead, the MMP's identification card is a part of a separate legislative scheme providing separate protections for persons engaged in the medical marijuana programs, and the MMP carefully declared that the protections provided by the CUA were preserved without the necessity of complying with the identification card provisions.

Because the MMP's identification card program has no impact on the protections provided by the CUA, we reject Counties' claim that those provisions are invalidated by Article II, section 10, subdivision c , of the California Constitution. All statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise specified. For example, the MMP's exemptions encompass a broad list of specified drug offenses from which qualified patients and primary caregivers would be immune.

The MMP provides that exempt persons would not " 'be subject, on that sole basis, to criminal liability under Section [possession of marijuana], [cultivation of marijuana], [possession for sale], [transportation], [maintaining a place for the sale, giving away or use of marijuana], However, this treaty is not self-executing, and Counties do not explain how the treaty lends any added weight to the preemption questions presented here.

County of Merced is not a party to this appeal and its complaint in intervention is not part of the record on appeal. However, we grant State's unopposed motion for judicial notice of County of Merced's complaint in intervention. The issue of standing, raised at trial, is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time notwithstanding the absence of a cross-appeal. Citizens for Uniform Laws v. County of Contra Costa Cal. Counties, citing Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors 49 Cal.

City and County of San Francisco 7 Cal. However, these cases did not hold a person willing to litigate a claim intensely acquires standing that is otherwise absent, and we are not aware of any case law suggesting that a willingness to fervently pursue a cause is the sine qua non of standing to litigate that cause.

Our decision to limit Counties' constitutional challenge to those portions of the CUA and MMP that directly affect them is consonant with "[w]ell-settled principles of judicial restraint [that establish] when a case must be decided upon constitutional grounds, a court should strive to resolve the matter as narrowly as possible, and should avoid expansive constitutional pronouncements that inevitably prejudge future controversies and may have unforeseen and questionable consequences in other contexts.

City of Richmond 10 Cal. This principle of jurisprudential restraint cautions against deciding broad constitutional questions raised, as here, by persons not injuriously affected by the challenged statute.

See generally Longval v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. Specifically, we examine Counties' preemption claims only as to sections We conclude Counties do not have standing to challenge and therefore we do not evaluate whether the remaining sections, and in particular sections The preemption clause evaluated by the Southern Blasting court provided that, "No provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such provision and the law of the State so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.

Justice Scalia explained that title 21 United States Code section only "affirmatively prescrib[ed]federal pre-emption whenever state law creates a conflict. In any event, the Directive does not purport to pre-empt state law in any way, not even by conflict pre-emption--unless the Court is under the misimpression that some States require assisted suicide. The Directive merely interprets the CSA to prohibit, like countless other federal criminal provisions, conduct that happens not to be forbidden under state law or at least the law of the State of Oregon.

The parties dispute whether obstacle preemption is merely an alternative iteration of conflict preemption, or whether obstacle preemption requires an analytical approach distinct from conflict preemption. Our Supreme Court, although recognizing that the courts have often "group[ed] conflict preemption and obstacle preemption together in a single category" Viva! In Geier and Sprietsma, the express preemption clauses precluded a state from establishing any safety standard regarding a vehicle Geier or vessel Sprietsma not identical to the federal standard, but separate "savings" clauses specified that compliance with the federal safety standards did not exempt any person from any liability under common law.

The analysis of the interplay between two statutes, as addressed by the Geier and Sprietsma courts, bears no resemblance to the issues presented here.

In Buckman Co. First, the Buckman court specifically recognized that the preemption issue there involved "[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies[, which] is hardly 'a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' [citation] such as to warrant a presumption against finding federal pre-emption of a state-law cause of action.

San Bernardino concedes on appeal that compliance with California law "may not require a violation of the CSA," although it then asserts it "encourages if not facilitates the CSA's violation.

However, none of the cited subdivisions are contained in the statutes that Counties have standing to challenge see fn.

The bulk of Counties' arguments on obstacle preemption focus on statutory provisions other than the identification card statutes. Because Counties do not have standing to challenge those statutes, we decline Counties' implicit invitation to issue an advisory opinion on whether those statutes are preempted by the CSA, and instead examine only those aspects of the statutory scheme imposing obligations on Counties.

San Diego argues the anti-commandeering doctrine discussed in Printz is inapplicable because the court in Hodel v. See People v. Lexis Although it is unclear either that the Kelly court was required to reach the issue or that its resolution of the issue was correct, Kelly did not purport to hold the entire MMP invalid but instead severed the quantity limitations of Section Because we here address different aspects of the MMP from that considered in Kelly, the conclusion in Kelly is inapposite to our task.

San Bernardino appears to rely on Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap Cal. However, the Planned Parenthood Affiliates court evaluated whether the legislation under consideration violated the single subject rule of Article IV, section 9 of the California Constitution, and had no occasion to consider whether the statute was invalid under Article II, section 10, subdivision c.

San Bernardino also quotes, without citation to the record, certain statements of legislative intent allegedly declaring the intent of the MMP was to "clarify the scope" of the CUA and "address issues that were not included in the [CUA].

Sheily Cal. The limits set forth in [the MMP] only serve to provide immunity from arrest for patients taking part in the voluntary ID card program, they do not change Section Search Cases. Search by Topics and Jurisdiction. Search by Topic Only. My Stuff. Search History. Starred Cases.

Accounts Settings. Search All Courts. This Document Cites the Following Cases:. Powers v. City of Richmond. City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court of Orange County. In re Jennings. Regents of the University of California v. Buckman Co. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee. ET AL. Holmes v. California National Guard. Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco. County of Los Angeles v. Printz v. United States. International Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations.

Longval v. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine. Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative. Proposition Enforcement Project v.

State Board of Equalization. Mobilepark West Homeowners Assn. Escondido Mobilepark West. Jones v. Southern Blasting Services. Lorillard Tobacco Company v. BOYLE v. HODEL v. This case is cited by:. County of Butte v.

Superior Court of Butte County. Habitat Trust for Wildlife. Pryor v. Strauss v. Qualified Patients Association v. City of Anaheim. City Council of Redwood City et al.

Ardon v. City of Los Angeles. Superior Court of Contra Costa County. KDF Post Street. Bearman v. California Medical Board. Yvette Brown v. County of Los Angeles. This case cites:. Federal Law - the CSA The CSA provides it is "unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional practice.

General Principles A declaratory relief action requires an "actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties. Limitations on Governmental Entities Plaintiffs here are local governmental entities that sought in the proceedings below, and seek in this appeal, a determination that they are not obligated to comply with their duties under the statutory scheme because the statutory scheme is unconstitutional.

Analysis State, relying on Lockyer, supra, 33 Cal. General Principles Principles of preemption have been articulated by numerous courts. License our industry-leading legal content to extend your thought leadership and build your brand. Duane Morris seeks an associate with years of experience to join its Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation Group.

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